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CLARIFYING THE DEFINITION OF RELIGION UNDER ENGLISH LAW:  
THE NEED FOR A UNIVERSAL DEFINITION?  
 
Russell Sandberg1 
 
There is no universal definition of religion under English law. Instead, different definitions 
have been developed by courts and tribunals in relation to different religious rights. Although 
there have been moves towards the harmonisation of these different definitions, recent 
decisions have reversed this trend. This article explores for the first time how this has led to a 
confused and contradictory case law. It begins by surveying how religion has been defined in 
registration law, charity law, human rights law and discrimination law: the moves towards 
harmonisation and the counter-tendencies in the recent decisions. It places the recent 
decisions within their broader legal context and points out a number of contradictions and 
uncertainties. Arguing that a universal definition of religion under English law is now 
needed, it synthesises the case laws to identify the elements of a universal definition that 
already exist. The article examines how these can be refashioned in order to remove 
inconsistencies that exist in different areas of law. Drawing upon insights from the sociology 
of religion the article concludes by proposing a new definition.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
There has never been a universal legal definition of religion in English law, and 
experience across the common law world over many years has shown the pitfalls of 
attempting to attach a narrowly circumscribed meaning to the word. There are several 
reasons for this – the different contexts in which the issue may arise, the variety of world 
religions, developments of new religions and religious practices, and developments in the 
common understanding of the concept of religion due to cultural changes in society.2 
 
Lord Toulson 
 
A number of definitions exist in law in relation to religion and belief. ... They reflect, to 
some extent, the different purposes that the laws are intended to have.  … What is, 
however, common with all those definitions is that none seeks to define what actual faiths 
or beliefs are covered by the law. That is left to the courts to decide, which is proper. 
…The courts are best placed to make decisions on these difficult matters, taking into 
account all the information that they will have before them.3 
 
Baroness Scotland  
 
Like all definitions, legal definitions primarily serve as mechanisms for inclusion and 
exclusion.4   Legal definitions demarcate the granting of benefits and burdens, of rights and 
duties: those included in the definition are recognised by law; those excluded are denied legal 
                                                 
2R (on the Application of Hodkin) v Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriages [2013] UKSC 77 para 
34. 
3
 House of Lords debate, 13 July 2005 col 1107-1108 
4
 R Sandberg, Religion, Law and Society (Cambridge, 2014) 39. 
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recognition.5  Legal definitions of religion which are adopted, whether explicitly or 
implicitly, determine which individuals and groups should be bestowed with legal advantages 
by virtue of the fact that they are ‘religious’.6 Defining religion is, therefore, ‘an exercise of 
power’ which can have serious repercussions.7  It is also something that sometimes cannot be 
avoided. Unlike scholars who are able to recognise the complexity of the issue posit a range 
of partial definitions and then move on, legal actors may well find that determining the 
definition of religion is crucial to the claim that they are dealing with.8 
The importance of defining religion is felt under English law9 despite the fact that 
there is no compulsory registration scheme for religious groups.  Instead, a multitude of 
overlapping laws have been enacted to recognise religious groups and to enable them to 
benefit from legal and fiscal advantages, most notably in the form of exceptions from 
otherwise generally-applicable obligations.  Religious groups may register their buildings as 
places of public religious worship and for the solemnisation of marriage.10  Moreover, such 
groups may seek to register as a charity for the advancement of religion.11  Individuals enjoy 
the human right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion and protection from 
discrimination on grounds of religion or belief.12  The definition and understanding of 
religion differs for each of these different religious rights.  This has led to the situation 
described by Lord Toulson and Baroness Scotland above; recognising the lack of a universal 
definition of religion and the practice whereby the matter is largely left to the courts to 
adjudicate.  Richard Robinson distinguished between ‘stipulative’ (or specific) definitions 
                                                 
5See, e.g., G C Thornton, Legislative Drafting (3rd edition, Oxford, 1987) 56-57. See also V Crabbe, Legislative 
Drafting (London, 1993) 109. 
6
 See J A Beckford, ‘The Politics of Defining Religion in Secular Society’ in J G Platvoet and A L Molendijk 
(eds) The Pragmatics of Defining Religion: Contexts, Concepts & Contests (Leiden, 1999) 23. 
7
 A Aldridge, Religion in the Contemporary World – A Sociological Introduction  (3rd edition, Oxford, 2013) 22. 
8
 P W Edge, ‘Determining Religion in English Courts’ (2012) 1(2) Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 402. 
9
 This article focuses on the law in England and Wales. The legal and religious context in Scotland and Northern 
Ireland merits separate treatment.  
10
 Places of Worship Registration Act 1855; Marriage Act 1949, s 4.  
11Charities Act 2011. 
12
 European Convention on Human Rights, Article 9; Equality Act 2010, s10. 
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that announce that the subject is to be understood in a certain sense in a certain context and 
‘lexical’ (or universal) definitions that report the customary meaning of the word.13 Under 
English law, there are several stipulative or specific definitions of religion developed by the 
case law on each area of law. However, there is no lexical or universal definition of religion.  
This article will contend that recent decisions have underscored the need for such a 
universal definition. The first part of this article will take a chronological approach exploring 
how the definition of religion under English law has developed over the last fifty years. It 
will be shown that there have been some moves towards the convergence of the different 
definitions of religion. The second part of the article will explore how recent decisions by the 
Supreme Court and Charity Commission have reversed this trend.  These decisions, it will be 
argued, have resulted in a complex and conflicting case law which point to a renewed need 
for a universal definition of religion under English law. The third and final part of this article 
will further this analysis drawing upon insights from the sociology of religion to suggest how 
a universal definition of religion could develop. 
 
II. TOWARDS A UNIVERSAL DEFINITION OF RELIGION  
 
A. The Common Law Definition 
 
Originally, the issue of defining religion did not arise. Following the English Reformation of 
the 1530s, there was only one lawful religion, the established Church of England.14  A 
                                                 
13
 R Robinson, Definition (Oxford, 1954) 19. 
14
 The English Reformation came later and was a different beast to that felt on the continent.  The divorce from 
Rome in the 1530s under Henry VIII was not a religious upheaval that required political and constitutional 
reconstruction; rather it was a political and constitutional act that led in time to religious upheaval. See G R 
Elton, ‘The Reformation in England’ in G R Elton (ed) The New Cambridge Modern History Volume 2: The 
Reformation, 1520–1559 (2nd edition, Cambridge, 1990) 262 and F W Maitland, English Law and the 
Renaissance (Cambridge, 1901) 9. 
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category of religion was therefore meaningless. When the Preamble to the Statute of 
Charitable Uses 1601 stated that gifts for the repair of churches were charitable,15 it was clear 
that this referred to the buildings of the established Church. And when subsequent case law 
recognised that trusts, gifts and institutions for the ‘advancement of religion’ were charitable 
and thus entitled to legal and fiscal advantages,16 it was likewise understood that this 
protected only the established Church of England.  The ‘superstitious use’, that is, a trust for 
false religious purposes, was void.17  As Newark put it, such gifts were ‘against public policy 
as furthering the schisms of nonconformity, the errors of Rome or the infidelity of Judaism or 
heathenism’.18  The long and piecemeal process of religious toleration, whereby disabilities 
placed on other religions were gradually removed, widened considerably the concept of 
advancement of religion and also changed the rationale for protecting religion.19  Rather than 
furthering the mission of the established Church and preventing heretical and false religions, 
it gradually became understood that the protection of religion provided recognition of the 
psychological and social worth of individual religiosity.20 As Lord Reid noted in Gilmour v 
Coats21, English law no longer prefers ‘one religion to another’ but ‘assumes that it is good 
for man to have and to practise a religion’. 
 It was not until the latter years of the twentieth century, however, that domestic courts 
elucidated a definition of religion, based upon stated criteria, and used this definition to 
                                                 
15
 The Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act 1888 repealed the statute itself but expressly preserved the preamble.  
The Charities Act 1960 repealed the 1888 Act and thus the preamble.  However, its final repeal does not affect 
the authority of the cases decided on it nor the principles on which future cases are to be decided: Incorporated 
Council of Law Reporting for England and Wales v A-G [1971] Ch 626 at 644.  See also Charities Act 2011 
Schedule 7, Part 1. 
16Pember v Inhabitants of Kington (1639) 1 EqCasAbr 95; Tot 34; Special Commissioners of Income Tax v 
Pemsel [1891] AC 531.   
17P W Edge, Legal Responses to Religious Difference (The Hague, 2002) 5. However, such gifts were 
sometimes upheld. In Da Costa v De Praz (1754) 2 Swan 487n a gift to advance the Jewish religion was held to 
be unlawful but Lord Hardwicke left it to the Crown to direct a cy-prés application whereby the gift was applied 
but for the purposes of the Christian religion.  
18
 FH Newark, ‘Public Benefit and Religious Trusts’ (1942) 62 Law Quarterly Review 234, 235.  
19
 See R Sandberg, Law and Religion (Cambridge, 2011) chapter 2. 
20F Quint and P Hodkin , ‘The Development of Tolerance and Diversity in the Treatment of Religion in Charity 
Law’ (2007) 10(2) Charity Law and Practice Review 1, 3.   
21[1949] AC 426 at 459. 
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determine claims. This occurred in two cases, concerning registration and charitable status 
respectively.  In the first, R v Registrar General, ex parte Segerdal22, the Court of Appeal 
upheld the decision by the Registrar General not to register a chapel of the Church of 
Scientology as ‘a place of meeting for religious worship’ under section 3 of the Places of 
Worship Registration Act 1855. For Buckley LJ and Winn LJ, the determinative factor was 
that there was no worship.  Winn LJ held that the adherents did not ‘humble themselves in 
reverence and recognition of the dominant power and control of any entity or being outside 
their own body and life’;23 while Buckley LJ held that worship ‘must have some at least of 
the following characteristics: submission to the object worshipped, veneration of that object, 
praise, thanksgiving, prayer or intercession’.24 He found that the evidence put forward, 
including the Church of Scientology’s book of ceremonies, contained ‘no element of worship 
at all’.25  By contrast, for Lord Denning MR, the phrase to be defined was ‘the combined 
phrase, “place of meeting for religious worship” as used in the statute of 1855’.26   For 
Denning, this connoted ‘a place of which the principal use is as a place where people come 
together as a congregation or assembly to do reverence to God’;  ‘Religious worship means 
reverence or veneration of God or of a Supreme Being’.  The decision in Segerdal did not, 
therefore, concern the definition of religion as such. The judgments of Buckley LJ and Winn 
LJ focused on the definition of worship simpliciter while Lord Denning sought to define the 
combined phrase religious worship.  It is curious, therefore, that this case concerning 
registration law was heavily relied upon in the second case which concerned charity law to 
provide a definition of religion.  
                                                 
22[1970] 2 QB 679. 
23At 709. 
24He qualified this: ‘I do not say that you would need to find every element in every act which could properly be 
described as worship, but when you find an act which contains none of those elements it cannot, in my 
judgment, answer to the description of an act of worship’: at 709. 
25At 709. 
26He noted that the Chapel of the Church of Scientology was not a ‘place of religious worship’ because the creed 
of the Church of Scientology was ‘more a philosophy of the existence of man or of life, rather than a religion’, 
there was an absence of ‘reverence or veneration’ and ‘considerable stress on the spirit of man’: at 707. 
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In the second case, Re South Place Ethical Society, Barralet v AG27, the court held 
that the South Place Ethical Society, a society for the ‘study and dissemination of ethical 
principles and the cultivation of a rational religious sentiment’, was not charitable for the 
advancement of religion.28 Echoing Lord Denning in Segerdal, Dillon J distinguished religion 
from ethics as being ‘concerned with man’s relations with God’ rather than ‘with man's 
relations with man’ and held that ‘two of the essential attributes of religion are faith and 
worship; faith in a god and worship of that god’.29  Quoting with approval Buckley LJ’s 
definition of worship in Segerdal, Dillon J concluded that the South Place Ethical Society did 
not have the purpose of advancing religion because there was no ‘worship in the sense which 
worship is an attribute of religion’: ‘indeed, it is not possible to worship in that way a mere 
ethical or philosophical ideal.’30  No explanation was given as to why worship ought to be a 
definitional aspect of the term advancement of religion. While Segerdal was concerned with 
defining the phrase ‘place of meeting for religious worship’ under registration law, Re South 
Place Ethical Society was concerned with defining ‘advancement of religion’ under charity 
law. Yet, the definition for the former was adopted without question for the latter.  The 
requirement for ‘faith in a god and worship of that god’ became to be understood as the 
common law definition of religion, except in relation to Buddhism which was accepted to be 
an ‘exception’.31 And this definition was used to exclude any religions where there was no 
evidence of worship. For instance, in 1999 the Charity Commission held that the Church of 
Scientology would not be registered as a charity on the basis that the ‘core practices of 
                                                 
27[1980] 1 WLR 1565. 
28
 It was held otherwise charitable either for the advancement of education or under the fourth head of charity by 
analogy with decided cases. 
29At 1571-2. 
30At 1573. 
31
 R v Registrar General, ex parte Segerdal [1970] 2 QB 679 at 707; Re South Place Ethical Society, Barralet v 
AG 1980] 1 WLR 1565 at 1573. 
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Scientology, being auditing and training, do not constitute worship as they do not display the 
essential characteristic of reverence or veneration for a supreme being’.32 
 
B. Developments in Human Rights and Discrimination Law  
 
At the turn of the century, a number of new laws were enacted in England and Wales dealing 
with religious rights.33  These statutory provisions defined and understood religion in broader 
terms. The Human Rights Act 1998 incorporated Article 9 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights into domestic law introducing a positive right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion including the manifestation of religion or belief.34   The domestic 
courts followed the approach of Strasbourg in adopting a broad understanding of religion or 
belief regarding it not only as  ‘one of the most vital elements that go to make up the identity 
of believers and their conception of life’ but also as ‘a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, 
sceptics and the unconcerned’.35  Strasbourg institutions considered claims concerning 
scientology,36 druidism,37  pacifism,38 communism,39 Nazism,40 atheism,41 pro-life,42 Divine 
Light Zentrum,43 the Moon Sect,44 as well as ‘splinter’ groups within larger traditions,45 and 
                                                 
32
 Church of Scientology Application to Charities Commission (17.11.99) see <http://www.charity-
commission.gov.uk/Library/registration/pdfs/cosfulldoc.pdf> 
33
 See R Sandberg, Law and Religion (Cambridge, 2011) chapter 10 and R Sandberg, Religion, Law and Society 
(Cambridge, 2014) chapter 1. 
34
 For discussion of the difference between positive and negative religious freedom see M Hill and R Sandberg, 
‘Is Nothing Sacred? Clashing Symbols in a Secular World’ [2007] Public Law 488, 490-491.  
35Kokkinakis v Greece (1994) 17 EHRR 397 at par a31; R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment 
and others,ex parte Williamson [2005] UKHL 15 at para 24.  
36Xand Church of Scientology v Sweden (1978) 16 DR 68. 
37Chappell v United Kingdom (1987) 53 DR 241. 
38Arrowsmtih v United Kingdom (1978) 19 D&R 5. 
39Hazar, Hazar and Acik v Turkey (1991) 72 D&R 200. 
40X v Austria (1981) 26 D&R 89. 
41Angeleni v Sweden (1986) 51 D&R 41. 
42Plattform ‘Ärtzefür das Leben’ v Austria (1985) 44 D&R 65. 
43Omkarananda and the Divine Light Zentrum v Switzerland (1981) 25 DR 105. 
44X v Austria (1981) 26 D&R 89. 
45E.g. Serif v Greece (1999) 31 EHRR 561 (Mufti elected by Mosque congregations in opposition to the Mufti 
appointed by the Government). 
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invariably did so without questioning whether such claims fit the definition of religion or 
belief.46  They considered term ‘belief’ to require a worldview rather than a mere opinion: it 
was defined in Campbell and Cosans v United Kingdom,47 as denoting ‘views that attain a 
certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance’. In R v Secretary of State for 
Education and Employment and others ex parte Williamson48 the House of Lords confirmed 
that this applies to both religious and non-religious beliefs and that: ‘Freedom of religion 
protects the subjective belief of an individual’.49  It was noted that where beliefs are 
manifested they need to satisfy ‘modest’ and ‘minimum requirements’ which are implicitly 
laid out in Article 9.50  However, their Lordships stated that courts should not ‘impose an 
evaluative filter’ at the stage of identifying whether there was a belief ‘except in extreme 
cases’.51 
An example of such an extreme case concerned the hunting ban. In Whaley v Lord 
Advocate52 their Lordships rejected the appellant’s contention that hunting with hounds 
constituted a non-religious belief. For Lord Hope, this belief did not meet the Williamson 
threshold since looking at it ‘objectively, hunting with hounds is carried on mainly for 
pleasure and relaxation for those who take part in it’.53 This reasoning was problematic, 
                                                 
46
 Though claimants have been required to prove the genuineness of their belief and the existence of the religion 
in question:  X v UK (1977) 11 DR 55; R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment and others,ex 
parte Williamson[2005] UKHL 15 at para 22. 
47(1982) 4 EHRR 293 at para 36. This was in relation to Article 2 of the first protocol to the ECHR. However, 
this definition has also been applied to Article 9 in Eweida and Others v United Kingdom (2013) 57 EHRR 8 at 
para 81. 
48[2005] UKHL 15. 
49Para 24. 
50
 ‘The belief must be consistent with basic standards of human dignity or integrity; ‘The belief must relate to 
matters more than merely trivial. It must possess an adequate degree of seriousness and importance’; ‘The belief 
must also be coherent in the sense of being intelligible and capable of being understood’.  These were described 
as ‘objective’ requirements but that does not require the belief itself to be assessed objectively but rather the 
criterion against which the belief is to be examined is to be assessed objectively. The definition of ‘basic 
standards of human dignity’, for instance, is an objective one. It was also stressed that: ‘Overall, these threshold 
requirements should not be set at a level which would deprive minority beliefs of the protection they are 
intended to have under the Convention’. 
51Para 58. 
52[2007] UKHL 53. 
53Para 18. 
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however, not only because the mention of an objective test contradicted the Williamson dicta 
that freedom of religion protected subjective beliefs, but also because it suggested that a line 
was to be drawn between beliefs that fell under Article 9 and others that did not.  Lord Hope 
held that the Strasbourg jurisprudence did ‘not support the proposition that a person’s belief 
in his right to engage in an activity which he carries on for pleasure or recreation, however 
fervent or passionate, can be equated with beliefs of the kind that are protected by Article 9’ 
since that would make it difficult to ‘set any limits on the range of beliefs that would be 
opened up for protection’.  However, neither his Lordship nor any subsequent judgments on 
Article 9 have articulated where these limits are to be placed.  
The case law on religious discrimination has followed the approach of the human 
rights jurisprudence not only in adopting a wide definition of religion or belief but also in 
struggling consistently to identify the limits that are to be placed on it.  Discrimination on the 
grounds of religion or belief was originally prohibited in England and Wales in relation only 
to employment under the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003,54 
which defined religion or belief as meaning ‘any religion, religious belief, or similar 
philosophical belief’.55  Employment Tribunals used the word ‘similar’ to exclude certain 
non-religious beliefs such as nationalistic and political beliefs.56 However, the Equality Act 
2006, which extended religion or belief discrimination to cover the provisions of goods and 
services, took the opportunity to remove the word ‘similar’ and to expressly include lack of 
belief.   The current definition, now found in section 10 of the Equality Act 2010, states that 
‘religion means any religion’ and ‘belief means any religious or philosophical belief’.57  
                                                 
54SI 2003/1660. 
55Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003, Reg 2(1). 
56Williams v South Central Limited ET, Case Number: 2306989/2003 (16 June 2004); Baggs v Fudge [2005] 
ET1400114/2005 (23 March 2005). See R Sandberg, ‘Flags, Beards and Pilgrimages: A Review of the Early 
Case Law on Religious Discrimination’ (2007) 9 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 87.  
57
 Equality Act 2010 s10. Definitions of religion also exist in the exceptions from discrimination law afforded to 
religious groups. Under Schedule 19 Para 3 of the Equality Act 2010, employers who have an ‘ethos based on 
religion or belief’ can discriminate on grounds of religion or belief in relation to employment. Under Paragraph 
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Ironically, a statement by the then Government Minister, Baroness Scotland that the new 
definition should make no difference itself led to a change in approach by Employment 
Tribunals. Baroness Scotland stated that the removal of the word ‘similar’ would make no 
difference because:  
the term “philosophical belief” will take its meaning from the context in which it 
appears; that is, as part of the legislation relating to discrimination on the grounds of 
religion or belief.  Given that context, philosophical beliefs must always be of a 
similar nature to religious beliefs. ... It will be for the courts to decide what constitutes 
a belief ... but case law suggests that any philosophical belief must attain a certain 
level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance, must be worthy of respect in 
a democratic society and must not be incompatible with human dignity. Therefore an 
example of a belief that might meet this description is humanism, and examples of 
something that might not … would be support of a political party or a belief in the 
supreme nature of the Jedi Knights.58 
Ironically, Baroness Scotland’s summary of the human rights case law requirements has been 
used to change the definition. Employment Tribunals have interpreted her words as providing 
a series of tests which apply to determine whether a belief is capable of being protected.   The 
                                                                                                                                                        
2 of schedule 9 to the Equality Act 2010, ‘organised religions’ can discriminate on grounds of sex, marriage and 
sexual orientation in relation to employment. These terms are undefined by the statute but in R (Amicus MSF 
Section) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2004] EWHC 860.Richards J held that term ‘organised 
religion’ was narrower than ‘religious organisation’: he gave the example that ‘employment as a teacher in a 
faith school is likely to be “for purposes of a religious organisation” but not “for purposes of an organised 
religion”’ (para 116). Under Paragraph 2 of Schedule 23 to the Equality Act 2010 there is a general exception 
for ‘organisations relating to religion or belief’ covering discrimination in relation to goods and services. An 
‘organisation relating to religion or belief’ is defined as ‘an organisation the purpose of which is— 
(a) to practise a religion or belief, 
(b) to advance a religion or belief, 
(c) to teach the practice or principles of a religion or belief, 
(d) to enable persons of a religion or belief to receive any benefit, or to engage in any 
activity, within the framework of that religion or belief, or 
(e) to foster or maintain good relations between persons of different religions or beliefs’. 
See, further, M Hill, R Sandberg and N Doe,  Religion Law: United Kingdom (2nded, The Netherlands 2014) 
154-160 and R Sandberg, ‘The Right to Discriminate’ (2011) 13 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 157. 
58
 House of Lords Hansard (2005-2006), 13 July 2005 Column1109-1110. 
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turning point was the decision of the Employment Appeal Tribunal in Grainger PLC v 
Nicholson59, which concluded that an asserted belief in man-made climate change, together 
with the alleged resulting moral imperatives arising from it, was capable of constituting a 
‘philosophical belief’ for the purpose of the 2003 Regulations because it met the criteria laid 
out by the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights which was directly relevant.   
Employment Judge Burton summarised the meaning of ‘philosophical belief’ as including 
five requirements:  
(i) The belief must be genuinely held. 
(ii) It must be a belief and not ... an opinion or viewpoint based on the present state of 
information available. 
(iii) It must be a belief as to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and 
behaviour. 
(iv) It must attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance. 
(v) It must be worthy of respect in a democratic society, be not incompatible with 
human dignity and not conflict with the fundamental rights of others.60 
 
Although these five principles can be found in the case law of the Strasbourg court, they have 
not been articulated in such a watertight way by the European Court of Human Rights. The 
application of the Strasbourg definitions is also problematic since, unlike domestic 
discrimination law, Article 9 does not distinguish between philosophical and non-
philosophical beliefs.  Following Grainger the five requirements have taken on an elevated 
importance. Employment Tribunal Chairs have subsequently applied these requirements as if 
they were a statutory test and have forgotten the warning in Williamson that these should be 
                                                 
59
 [2009] UKEAT 0219/09/ZT (3 November 2009). 
60At para 24. 
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‘minimum’ and ‘modest’ requirements.61 They have interpreted the tests in different ways to 
reach inconsistent and arbitrary decisions. Employment Tribunals have considered the tests to 
be met in cases concerning beliefs in spiritualism and psychic powers,62  anti-fox hunting 
beliefs,63 beliefs in the virtue of public service broadcasting,64 and Humanist beliefs.65  In 
contrast, other Employment Tribunals have concluded that the tests have not been met in 
cases concerning Marxist / Trotskyite beliefs held by trade union members,66 beliefs in 
conspiracy theories regarding 9/11,67and a belief that belief that a Poppy should be worn 
during the week prior to Remembrance Sunday.68  Drawing any points of principle out of this 
case law is difficult, to say the least.69 
The confusion is epitomised by the way that it is now unclear as to whether political 
beliefs are protected under discrimination law.70 In Grainger, it was suggested that Baroness 
Scotland’s choice of words referring only to ‘support for a political party’ as something that 
might not be protected left open the question of whether ‘a belief in a political philosophy or 
doctrine’ might now fall within the definition.71   In Kelly v Unison72 it was suggested that a 
distinction could be drawn between ‘political beliefs which involve the objective of the 
creation of a legally binding structure by power or government regulating others’, which are 
not protected, and the beliefs that ‘are expressed by his own practice but where he has no 
                                                 
61R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment and others ex parte Williamson [2005] UKHL 15 para 
24. 
62Greater Manchester Police Authority v Power [2009] EAT 0434/09/DA (12November 2009).  
63Hashman v Milton Park (Dorset) Ltd [2011] ET  3105555/2009 (31 January 2011). 
64Maistry v The BBC [2011] ET 1213142/2010 (14 February 2011). The definition point was not challenged on 
appeal: [2014] EWCA Civ 1116. 
65Streatfield v London Philharmonic Orchestra Ltd  [2012] 2390772/2011(22 May 2012). 
66Kelly v Unison [2009] ET 2203854/08 (22 December 2009). 
67Farrell v South Yorkshire Police Authority [2011] ET 2803805/2010 (24 May 2011). 
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 See, further, R Sandberg, Religion, Law and Society (Cambridge, 2014) 38-46 and R Sandberg, ‘A Question 
of Belief’ in N Spencer (ed), Religion and Law (London 2012) 51. 
70See, further, R Sandberg, ‘Are Political Beliefs Religious Now?’(2015) 175 Law and Justice 180. 
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72[2009] ET 2203854/08 (22 December 2009), para 114. 
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ambition to impose his scheme on others’, which may be protected.73 However, this 
distinction has not found favour with subsequent Employment Tribunal decisions with 
employment tribunals chairs in several cases ignoring the question of whether the belief 
might have been ‘political’ or stating that  the appellate courts had not definitely determined 
the question of whether political beliefs could now be included.  The confusion here results 
from the partial harmonisation of the definition of religion or belief in human rights and 
discrimination law contexts.  Employment Tribunals have followed Baroness Scotland in 
adopting the wide approach to the definition of belief found in human rights law but they 
have come unstuck given that discrimination law explicitly protects only religious or 
philosophical beliefs.74 As with the adaption of the registration law definition of religion for 
charity law purposes in Re South Place Ethical Society, the pragmatic appropriation of 
definitional criteria is problematic, given that significant differences between the definitions 
have been ignored. The problem is that the move towards a universal definition has been half-
hearted.  
 
C. Developments in Charity Law  
 
This problem has increased in the context of charity law itself.  The Charities Act 2006, in 
providing the first codification of centuries of case law, stated that religion includes ‘a 
religion which involves belief in more than one god, and a religion which does not involve 
belief in a god’.75   This removed theoretical uncertainty surrounding whether the Segerdal-
                                                 
73
 This distinction is odd, however, given that many religions proselytise and so could be said to have an 
ambition to impose their beliefs on others.   
74
 This uncertainty is even more problematic given the changes as a result of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and 
Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 and a hike in costs. For discussion of the effect of legal aid cuts upon the 
religious disputes see R Sandberg and S Thompson, ‘The Sharia Debate: The Missing Family Law Context’ 
(2016) 177 Law & Justice 188 and R Sandberg and S Thompson, ‘Relational Autonomy and Religious 
Tribunals’ (2017) Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 237. 
75
 Section 2(3)(a). This is now to be found in section 3(2)(a) of the Charities Act 2011.  
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South Place Ethical Society formula excluded those faiths which believe in more than one 
god, such as Buddhism.  The inadequacy of the common law definition had been shown in 
the judgments themselves where the judges had accepted that Buddhism was clearly a 
religion despite being outside the letter of the articulated definition.  And so, again like the 
removal of the word ‘similar’ in the discrimination law context, the purpose behind the 
partial definition in the Charities Act was to clarify rather than change the law. However, 
here too, the revised definition prompted a change in the interpretation of the right.  In 
determining whether an application satisfied the definition of advancement of religion, the 
Charity Commission came to the conclusion that there were now ‘four characteristics of a 
religion for the purpose of charity law’, curiously relying exclusively on its own guidance to 
modernise the common law test in light of the 2006 Act.76 In its decision on an application by 
the Gnostic Society,77  the Charity Commission held that the four characteristics of a religion 
were:   
a. belief in a god (or gods) or goddess (or goddesses), or supreme being, or divine or 
transcendental being or entity or spiritual principle, which is the object or focus of 
the religion (referred to ...as ‘supreme being or entity’); 
b. a relationship between the believer and the supreme being or entity by showing 
worship of, reverence for or veneration of the supreme being or entity;  
c. a degree of cogency, cohesion, seriousness and importance;  
d. an identifiable positive, beneficial, moral or ethical framework’.78 
 
                                                 
76
 Charity Commission, Analysis of the law underpinning Public Benefit and the Advancement of Religion, 
February 2008.The 2006 Act provided that the Commission could issue guidance, but there is nothing in the Act 
to suggest that this guidance will be binding. The Commission is subject to the existing law of charities, just as 
it was before enactment’: J Hackney, ‘Charities and Public Benefit’ (2008) 124 Law Quarterly Review 347, 350. 
77Application for Registration of the Gnostic Centre (16.12.2009).Para 23. 
78Para 23. 
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The first two characteristics elaborated and developed the common law definition of religion 
which required belief in and worship of a God. Although this was presumably intended to 
reflect the provisions of the Charities Act 2006, the first characteristic is inconsistent with the 
statute. While belief in multiple gods was mentioned, the statutory language of ‘a religion 
which does not involve belief in a god’ is missing. The provision seems to have been 
interpreted restrictively by the Charity Commission to only include ‘spiritual’ or 
‘transcendental’ beliefs that did not involve a belief in a God rather than beliefs that denied 
the existence of God. The language of the Act seemed to include atheism; the language of the 
Charity Commission excluded atheism and questions whether humanism is protected.  The 
Charity Commission simply introduced synonyms for God, summarised in the phrase 
‘supreme being or entity’. 
The Commission’s second characteristic updated the common law test concerning 
worship. It is notable that parts of the common law definition of worship (‘reverence’, 
‘veneration’) were now considered to be interchangeable with the term itself. Presumably, the 
Charity Commission considered itself bound by South Place Ethical Society to include this 
characteristic despite the fact that logically there is no reason why worship should be a 
definitional attribute of ‘advancement of religion’ under charity law (as opposed to ‘a place 
of meeting for religious worship’ under the Places of Worship Registration Act 1855).  
Although secular belief systems may still enjoy the fiscal and legal benefits of being 
charitable provided that they come under another head of charity,79 their exclusion from the 
head of advancement of religion may well infringe Article 9 ECHR which talks of the right to 
                                                 
79
 In 2002 the Charity Commission recognised the ‘promotion of religious harmony’ as a new charitable purpose 
which is not restricted to ‘religions’ hitherto recognised under charity law but also includes ‘beliefs’ as 
recognised by the ECHR.  
<http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/registeredcharities/harmony.asp>. See now Charities Act 2011s3(1)(h). 
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manifest religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice or observance.80 This point is 
underlined by the third characteristic articulated by the Charity Commission which brought 
charity law in line with the requirements found in the Article 9 jurisprudence requiring 
‘cogency, cohesion, seriousness and importance’, again without the Williamson warning that 
‘too much should not be demanded in this regard’ and that these are to be interpreted as 
‘minimum’ and ‘modest’ requirements.81 As with discrimination law, aspects of the 
definition of religion for Article 9 purposes became part of the charity law definition but no 
attempt was given to square the fact that charity law does not protect religion or belief but 
only protects religion (and beliefs in a ‘supreme being or entity’). Indeed, both the third and 
fourth characteristics were new and lacked any statutory or judicial authority.  The fourth 
characteristic introduced a public benefit requirement into the Charity Commission’s 
definition of religion, muddying the Commission’s own distinction between identifying 
whether the trust has met a description of charitable purposes and identifying whether there is 
a public benefit.82 
As with the five tests laid out in Grainger, the Charity Commission’s four 
characteristics have led to seemingly arbitrary decisions. The decision in relation to the 
Gnostic Society relied heavily upon the fourth characteristic and seemingly rejected the 
application on the basis that the Society did not correspond with the Commission’s 
expectations of an institutional religion. Although the Gnostic Society prayed for humanity 
and followed Christian teachings such as ‘love thy neighbour’, the Commission found it 
striking that ‘there was no evidence of consistent application of such codes on their website 
                                                 
80
 See, further, P W Edge, ‘Charitable Status for the Advancement of Religion: An Abolitionist’s View’ 
(1995/6) 3(1) The Charity Law & Practice Review 29. 
81R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment and others ex parte Williamson [2005] UKHL 15 para 
24. 
82
 Peter Luxton and Nicola Evans have pointed out that the Guidance document which the Commission cites 
‘curiously makes no mention of the fourth characteristic, and so, not surprisingly makes no attempt (at least 
directly) to provide legal authority for it’: P Luxton and N Evans, ‘Cogent and Cohesive? Two Recent Charity 
Commission Decisions on the Advancement of Religion’ [2011] Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 144, 146. 
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or in the literature’.83 The dismissal of the application of the Gnostic Society was followed by 
the successful application by the Druid Network.84  In this decision, the Commission again 
applied its four characteristics of religion.85 Here, however, in relation to the fourth 
characteristic, the Commission referred to the Network’s ‘principle of honourable 
relationships’ and the way in which the promotion of ethical codes were integrated explicitly 
in its objects and through its website.86  The Commission therefore concluded that there was 
‘evidence of an identifiable positive beneficial ethical framework promoted by the Druid 
Network that is capable of having a beneficial impact on the community at large’.87  The 
weight afforded to the presence of doctrinal statements on the Internet is concerning. It is 
difficult to disagree with the assessment of Luxton and Evans that the reasoning of the 
Commission in both the Gnostic Society and Druid Network applications was reached ‘in 
reliance on the Commission’s own guidance with virtually no mention, let alone analysis, of 
the underlying case law and its application to the case in hand’.88 For Luxton and Evans, 
these two decisions demonstrated ‘the Commission’s lack of awareness of the need for legal 
rigour when making a legal decision’.  
The two decisions also show further the problems resulting from the partial 
appropriation of definitional criteria from the human rights jurisprudence. The four 
characteristics represented a confused cocktail of criteria adapted from the Commission’s 
own guidance, the human rights jurisprudence, the Charities Act 2006 and the common law 
definition which itself appropriated the registration law definition of ‘religious worship’. 
Ironically, although this last criterion was the most legally binding upon the Commission 
                                                 
83Application for Registration of the Gnostic Centre (16.12.2009) para 44. 
84Application for Registration of the Druid Network (21.09.2010). 
85Para 20. 
86Paras 50 and 51. 
87Para 53. 
88P Luxton and N Evans, ‘Cogent and Cohesive?Two Recent Charity Commission Decisions on the 
Advancement of Religion’ [2011] Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 144, 150. 
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given the South Place Ethical Society judgment, it was also the criterion that felt most out of 
sync with the other developments given the wider adoption of the human rights approach.  
Indeed, the House of Lords in Williamson89 held that the ‘trend of authority (unsurprisingly in 
an age of increasingly multicultural societies and increasing respect for human rights) is 
towards a “newer, more expansive, reading” of religion’. It could therefore have been 
expected that any new judicial decision on the definition of religion would take the 
opportunity not only to place that the South Place Ethical Society judgment aside but to 
further harmonise the definition of religion following the approach taken by both the Charity 
Commission and Employment Tribunals in terms of bringing the law in line with the human 
rights jurisprudence. Unfortunately when the opportunity arose for the judiciary to reconsider 
the matter in R (on the Application of Hodkin) v Registrar General of Births, Deaths and 
Marriages90, it was in the context of registration rather than charity law and the Supreme 
Court did not go as far as it could have done.   
 
III. THE MOVE AWAY FROM A UNIVERSAL DEFINITION  
 
A. The Decision in Hodkin 
 
The decision in Hodkin was on the exact same point as Segerdal91, namely whether a chapel 
of the Church of Scientology could be registered as ‘a place of meeting for religious worship’ 
under the Places of Worship Registration Act 1855. Given that the lower courts were bound 
by the previous decision, the case ultimately found itself in front of the Supreme Court.  It 
was unsurprising given the legal and social changes since 1970 that Lord Toulson in Hodkin 
                                                 
89R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment and others ex parte Williamson [2005] UKHL 15 at para 
55. 
90[2013] UKSC 77. 
91[1970] 2 QB 679. 
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noted that ‘the understanding of religion in today’s society is broad’ and overruled the 
decision in Segerdal.92 It was surprising, however, that the Supreme Court considered 
arguments based on human rights to be unnecessary, deciding to overrule Segerdal on other 
grounds and created a definition that could only apply for the purposes of the Places of 
Worship Registration Act 1855.93 
 In some respects Lord Toulson’s speech pointed towards a universal definition of 
religion.  In contrast to the judgments in Segerdal, Lord Toulson held that the question of 
whether there was religious worship was ‘inevitably conditioned by whether Scientology is to 
be regarded as a religion’.94  Lord Toulson upheld the High Court’s decision that Scientology 
was a religion and stressed that the phrase ‘place of meeting for religious worship’ found in 
the 1855 Act had to be interpreted in ‘accordance with contemporary understanding of 
religion and not by reference to the culture of 1855’.95  This meant that in the absence of 
‘some compelling contextual reason for holding otherwise, religion should not be confined to 
religions which recognise a supreme deity’ since this would ‘be a form of religious 
discrimination unacceptable in today’s society’.96  His Lordship held that confining religion 
in such a way would lead the court ‘into difficult theological territory’ in a way that was   
inappropriate.97  And he noted that the fact that Lord Denning in Segerdal recognised the 
need to make an exception for Buddhist temples and the absence of a satisfactory explanation 
for the rule were ‘powerful indications that there is something unsound in the supposed 
general rule’.98  The statutory language instead called for an ‘intentionally broad sweep’.99 
                                                 
92[2013] UKSC 77 at para 55. 
93At para 65. 
94Para 31. 
95Para 34. 
96Para 51. 
97
 Paras 52-53. 
98Para 51. 
99Para 56. 
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 However, in articulating what religion meant, Lord Toulson’s speech pointed against 
a universal definition of religion by providing ‘a description and not a definitive formula’ of 
religion which could only serve for the purposes of the 1855 Act. Drawing upon the 
jurisprudence of other common law jurisdictions,100 his Lordship held that religion could be 
described in summary as: 
a spiritual or non-secular belief system, held by a group of adherents, which claims to 
explain mankind’s place in the universe and relationship with the infinite, and to teach 
its adherents how they are to live their lives in conformity with the spiritual 
understanding associated with the belief system.101 
This description is problematic in three respects. First, the reference to ‘spiritual or non-
secular’ creates a distinction between secular and non-secular beliefs which is not compatible 
with Article 9 ECHR, discrimination law and arguably the Charities Act 2011 (though not the 
Charity Commission’s interpretation of it). As Lord Toulson pointed out, the exclusion of 
secular belief systems is appropriate under the Places of Worship Registration Act 1855 
because there are other legal provisions which allow for secular wedding services on 
approved premises.102  Yet, this means that Lord Toulson’s description cannot and should not 
be used in other areas of the law where alternative and equal provision is not afforded to 
secular beliefs. Lord Toulson’s distinction between spiritual and secular is also challenging 
because it would again seem to open the door to inappropriate theological debates. This is 
ironically Lord Toulson’s reason for omitting any reference to a supreme being.  Lord 
Toulson clarified that he intended to refer to ‘a belief system which goes beyond which can 
be perceived by the senses or ascertained by the application of science’ and preferred not to 
use the term ‘supernatural’ to express this ‘because it is a loaded word which can carry a 
                                                 
100
 See paras 35-49. 
101Para 57. 
102
 Paras 58-59.   
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variety of connotations’. However, this would seem to overlook the fact that this same 
criticism would also apply to word ‘non-secular’.103 The same criticism can be applied to 
Lord Toulson’s reference to ‘the infinite’. It is difficult to see how this is a significant 
improvement upon talk of a ‘supreme being’. It would have been preferable not to state what 
a belief is to be about but rather to adopt the human rights approach that beliefs are 
worldviews.  
Second, Lord Toulson’s definition viewed religion as being necessarily a collective 
affair; it is something ‘held by a group of adherents’.104 Again, this is appropriate in the 
context of the 1855 Act but should not have wider application. Human rights, discrimination 
and charity law decisions have all protected individuals who develop their own religious 
beliefs including in ways that differ from the mainstream of the religious group.105 Such 
beliefs would be excluded by Lord Toulson and so it is questionable whether the description 
is Article 9 compliant.  Third, while Lord Toulson’s speech is helpful in that it underlined 
that the definitions of religion and worship for the purpose of the 1855 Act should be dealt 
with distinctly, it is regrettable that further clarity on the definition of worship was not 
provided. Lord Toulson dealt with the question of worship separately but briefly.  He held 
that even if the meaning given to worship in Segerdal ‘was not unduly narrow in 1970, it is 
unduly narrow now’.106  The term ‘religious worship’ should be interpreted as being ‘wide 
enough to include religious services, whether or not the form of service falls within the 
narrower definition adopted in Segerdal’.107 Unfortunately, however, his Lordship gave no 
                                                 
103
 The matter is confused further by the way in which terms like ‘secular’, ‘secularisation’ and ‘secularism’ are 
used interchangeably. See, e.g., J Casanova, ‘The Secular, Secularizations, Secularism’ in C Calhourn, M 
Juergensmeyer and J Van Antwerpen (eds) Rethinking Secularism (Oxford, 2011) 54. 
104
 Emphasis added.  
105
 This would include (say) Christians who felt obliged to wear crosses even though the majority do not feel so 
obligated. The European Court of Human Rights’ decision in Eweida and Others v United Kingdom (2013) 57 
EHRR 8 suggests that such persons should be protected under Article 9. In the context of charity law, see the 
decision in Thornton v Howe (1862) 31 Beavan 14. 
106Para 61. 
107Para 62. 
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further guidance as to how wide the definition of worship was to be now, only quoting from 
dictionary definitions which defined worship as including performing acts of adoration, 
feeling or expressing reverence and adoration and the taking part in religious service, 
religious rites and ceremonies.108 
Although it provided some clarity in making a number of general remarks about the 
need for a broad definition of religion, Lord Toulson’s description deliberately applied solely 
for the purposes of the Places of Worship Registration Act 1855.  There are several elements 
of the description which could lead to unfortunate results if applied in relation to human 
rights, discrimination law or even charity law. This is to be regretted since, despite Lord 
Toulson’s insistence that he was providing a description not a definition, the fact that this 
description has been given in a Supreme Court judgment means that it is likely to be very 
influential in a number of areas of law. This is especially true in relation to the charity law 
given that the definition of religion in South Place Ethical Society was based upon the 
Segerdal decision which Hodkin overruled.  Unlike Segerdal, the Supreme Court in Hodkin 
did not regard ‘worship’ as part of the definition of ‘religion’. It would be expected that this 
should have implications for the charity law definition of advancement of religion. However, 
when it fell to the Charity Commission to decide the extent to which Hodkin would affect its 
fourfold definition of religion, the Commission’s decision further muddied the waters.  Given 
the complex ways in which the various case laws concerning the definition of religion have 
overlapped it was perhaps fitting that the first opportunity for the Charity Commission to 
determine this came not in relation to the Church of Scientology (which is yet to re-apply for 
                                                 
108Indeed, it was curious that instead of following South Place Ethical Society in regarding worship as a 
definitional attribute of religion, Lord Toulson identified ‘teaching’ as part of his description. This raises the 
similar concerns as the old common law definition given that Article 9 ECHR which refers to religion of belief 
being manifested ‘in worship, teaching, practice and observance’.  Lord Toulson’s definition only seems to 
relate to teaching and observance.   
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charitable status for the advancement of religion) but in relation to one of the examples given 
by Baroness Scotland of what ‘might not constitute a religion or belief’: Jediism.  
 
B. Return of the Jedi  
 
Despite Baroness Scotland’s remark, the question of whether Jediism (a belief ‘in the Force’ 
that is linked to ideas found within Star Wars film series) constitutes a religion is not as 
outlandish as it may first appear.109 An academic literature exists on so-called  ‘hyper-real 
religions’, that is, ‘how some science fiction, horror, and fantasy narratives can be understood 
as cultural reservoirs for the construction of religion by spiritual consumers’.110 And even if a 
significant number of those who declared their religion as Jediism in recent UK censuses did 
so as a joke or protest, the size of those numbers comparable to other groups such as the 
Church of Scientology meant that it cannot be completely ignored.111  Moreover, regardless 
of the subject-matter of the claim, the Charity Commission’s decision to reject an application 
for registration by the Temple of the Jedi Order (TOTJO) provided the first opportunity to see 
how Hodkin has affected its understanding of the definition of religion.112 The decision noted 
that the ‘definition and characteristics of religion for the purposes of charity law are distilled’ 
from statutes and cases on charity law and their published guidance, which is now 
‘influenced’ by Hodkin although it ‘did not relate to a matter of charity law’.113 The influence 
                                                 
109
 For an account of Jediism as a religion, see B Singler, ‘Internet-Based New Religious Movements and 
Dispute Resolution’ in R Sandberg (ed) Religion and Legal Pluralism (Aldershot, 2015) 161. 
110
 A Possamai, Religion and Popular Culture: A Hyper-Real Testament (Brussels, 2005) 58. See also Carole M. 
Cusack, Invented Religions: Imagination, Fiction and Faith (Aldershot, 2010). Other hyper-real religions 
inspired by science fiction include neo-Pagan groups such as Church of All Worlds as well as largely Internet-
based movements such as Matrixism (based on The Matrix film trilogy by Larry and Andy Wachowski). 
111
 The number of Jedis was 390,127 in the 2001 census and 176,632 in the 2011 census.  
Scientology’s numbers in the UK Censuses were 1,781 in 2001 and 2,418 in 2011.  
112Application for Registration by the Temple of the Jedi Order (16.12.16). 
113Para 9. 
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of Hodkin led the Charity Commission to re-formulate certain aspects of its four 
characteristics of a religion in ways that were often startling.   
The influence of Hodkin was most visible in the reformulated first characteristic that 
now spoke of a need for a ‘Belief in one or more gods or spiritual or non-secular principles or 
things’. Following Hodkin, the ‘faith in a God’ test now does not include reference to 
supreme beings but rather talks of ‘principles or things’ and distinguishes between spiritual 
and secular belief systems.  This allowed the Charity Commission to continue its narrow 
interpretation despite the fact that, as it noted, ‘the statutory definition of religion includes 
religions which do not involve belief in a god’.114  For the Charity Commission, religions that 
do not involve belief in a god will only be religions if the principle or thing they believe in is 
spiritual and non-secular. This follows Hodkin but ignores the fact that the exclusion of 
secular belief systems made sense in the context of the registration of premises for the 
solemnisation of marriage because there are other legal provisions which allow for secular 
wedding services on approved premises. In contrast, there is no argument for making a 
distinction between secular and non-secular beliefs for the purpose of charity law (although 
Commission decisions before Hodkin had distinguished between ‘spiritual’ or 
‘transcendental’ beliefs and beliefs that denied the existence of a supreme being or entity). It 
is true that secular beliefs can still be charitable if they fulfil a different charitable purpose 
such as the promotion of moral or ethical improvement. However, this seems out of sync with 
the general direction of human rights and equality laws protecting both secular and non-
secular worldviews and an argument could be made that the narrow approach taken by the 
Charity Commission is incompatible with Article 9 ECHR.   The influence of Hodkin in 
removing the synonyms for God is to be welcomed but its influence in distinguishing secular 
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and non-secular belief systems seems to have overshadowed what that judgment also said 
about the need for a broad approach to definition.  
 The second requirement seems unaffected by Hodkin other than the removal of the 
mention of supreme beings.  The ‘worship of a God’ test from Re South Place Ethical Society 
has been revised so that now there must be a ‘Relationship with the gods, principles or things 
which is expressed by worship, reverence and adoration, veneration, intercession or by some 
other religious rite or service’. It is questionable whether worship should be a compulsory 
definitional attribute for the purposes of charity law especially given that Segerdal (the case 
upon which Re South Place Ethical Society relied) is no longer good law. It is also noticeable 
that this section of the Charity Commission’s decision on Jediism does not cite Hodkin. The 
Charity Commission appears to have ignored the fact that the Supreme Court did not regard 
worship as part of the definition of religion. Even if it is accepted that this test should still 
apply in charity law, the Hodkin dicta that the Segerdal test was ‘unduly narrow and that the 
term should be interpreted as being ‘wide enough to include religious services’ has also been 
disregarded by the Charity Commission.  In contrast, the Commission decided that despite 
evidence of meditation, sermons and ‘transcripts of the Live Services’, Jediism did not meet 
this second requirement. Curiously two factors were singled out in this part of the decision: 
the fact that ‘TOTJO is an entirely web based organisation’ and ‘that Jediism may be adopted 
as a lifestyle choice as opposed to a religion’.115 This seems to be a conservative approach, 
rejecting the possibility that religious activity can occur online and policing a rigid and 
artificial line between religion and lifestyle choices which is out of sync with the approach 
under English law to regard religious groups like any other voluntary associations.116 
 The fact that Hodkin did not rely upon the ECHR case law has not affected the 
Charity Commission’s third characteristic of religion which is now framed as: ‘Cogency, 
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cohesion, seriousness and importance in the form of the belief system’. The reference to 
‘belief system’ is interesting here given that charity law protects ‘religion’ rather than 
‘religion or belief’. This underlines that some forms of belief are to be included as part of the 
definition of religion. The inclusion of this ECHR requirement is preferable to its exclusion 
in Hodkin given the requirements of the Human Rights Act 1998. However, again the 
Williamson warnings about these requirements needing to be set at a ‘minimum’ and 
‘modest’ level’ are omitted.117  Furthermore, the way in which the Commission articulated 
this requirement is problematic in two respects. First, the Commission stated that Jediism is 
not a ‘sufficiently cogent and distinct religion’.118 No authority is given for this requirement 
that a religion needs to be ‘distinct’ and, although ecumenical and interfaith groups could 
instead seek charitable status for the promotion of religious harmony,119 this novel 
requirement would prove problematic given that many religions have much in common and 
religions often develop from one another. Second, the Commission stated that there ‘is 
insufficient evidence of an objective understanding of Jediism as opposed to a self-defining 
system which may be pursued outside the confines of a religion and in a secular manner’ and 
placed weight on the fact that ‘it is not obligatory to interpret and follow the Jedi Doctrine as 
areligion’.120 The Commission considered that: ‘Any cogency and cohesion that is present is 
eroded by the individual’s ability to develop themselves within a loose framework and follow 
an individual experiential philosophy or way of life as a secular belief system’.121 This would 
rule out individualised religious experiences contrary to the principle expressed in 
Williamson122 that ‘Freedom of religion protects the subjective belief of an individual’ and 
                                                 
117R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment and others ex parte Williamson [2005] UKHL 15 para 
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118Application for Registration by the Temple of the Jedi Order (16.12.16), para 24. 
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the general approach that individuals can manifest their religion by practices that they do not 
share with their co-religionists and which are not obligatory according to their faith.123 The 
fourth requirement, that ‘Doctrines and practice of benefit to the public [and are] capable of 
providing moral and ethical value or edification to the public’, remained unchanged and 
continued the Charity Commission’s suspect practice incorporating a public benefit 
requirement into the Charity Commission’s definition of religion.  
 The Jediism decision clearly represented a development in the Charity Commission’s 
understanding of the definition of religion. It revealed that the Commission has relied upon 
Hodkin in deeply selective ways that are problematic. Without questioning the actual 
decision, elements of the reasoning by the Charity Commission are cause for concern. In 
relation to first requirement, the influence of Hodkin has been significant and has led to the 
adoption of a distinction between the secular and non-secular that is not appropriate outside 
the registration context.  By contrast, in relation to the second requirement, Hodkin has been 
ignored and worship remains a definitional attribute of religion for charity law purposes as if 
Segerdal was still good law. Further, a questionable distinction has been made between 
religions and lifestyle choices that seems to apply only in relation to charity law. The Charity 
Commission’s articulation of their third characteristic shows that it is not only deriving 
guidance from the ECHR case law but are embellishing it in ways that are problematic 
adding a requirement that religions need to be ‘distinct’ and operating from an assumption 
that religions can be objectively described, are obligatory upon members and that members 
are uniform in how they manifest their religion. The Jediism decision underscores how the 
definition of religion under English law is now hideously confused.  
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IV. CONCLUSION:   THE NEED FOR A UNIVERSAL DEFINITION OF 
RELIGION?  
 
In Hodkin, Lord Toulson stated that there were several reasons why there had never been a 
universal legal definition of religion in English law, namely the different contexts in which 
the issue may arise and increased religious pluralism and diversity.124 These factors, though 
important, are not fatal to the quest for definition.125 Although religious pluralism and 
diversity renders the definition of religion more difficult, it also renders it more important.  
The sociological fact that religion ‘can no longer be equated with familiar mainstream church 
and denominational forms but takes a plurality of guides’ renders ‘the boundaries between 
religion and non-religion bewilderingly fuzzy’.126 It also makes the legal definition of 
religion increasingly vital.  Legal decision-makers rarely have the luxury of a ‘fuzzy’ 
outcome and the decisions they make affect not just the claims in front of them but those who 
will bring and will not bring claims in the future. Defining religion is an exercise in power 
that has significant legal, political, economic, social and cultural effects.127 As James Wiggins 
has argued, religious diversity requires the conclusion that the definition of religion ‘must 
become more expansive and elastic than ever before in human history’.128  Yet, an overly 
expansive approach may render the term religion meaningless. The central problem remains 
that identified by the sociologist Georg Simmel: managing to craft a definition of religion that 
is both precise and sufficiently comprehensive.129 
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 The approach generally taken by English law has been to regard the difficulties 
surrounding the definition of religion as requiring the crafting of several stipulative or 
specific definitions of religion developed by the case law on each area of law rather than 
crafting a lexical or universal definition of religion. Yet, this approach has proved to be 
inadequate. From South Place Ethical Society onwards, there has been a tradition of 
pragmatically appropriating parts of definitions of religion from one legal context into 
another. The incorporation of Article 9 into domestic law and the requirement to read 
legislation where possible in a Convention-compliant way has given legal force to this 
harmonisation. Yet, in recent years, legal decision-makers have swum against this tide and in 
so doing have created waves that may well torpedo future claims. In Hodkin, Lord Toulson 
noted the need for a broad definition of religion but only provided a description of religion 
for the purpose to the 1855 Act.  The limitations of this came to the fore in the Charity 
Commission’s decision on Jediism which underscored how confused and arbitrary the case 
law has become. There Hodkin was relied upon to erect a problematic distinction between 
secular and non-secular belief systems that now applies under charity and registration law but 
not under human rights and discrimination law. Hodkin was then ignored to state that worship 
remains a definitional attribute of religion for charity law purposes despite the fact that the 
Segerdal decision upon which South Place Ethical Society relied is no longer good law. 
Unlike in Hodkin, the Charity Commission applied ECHR standards about the nature of a 
religion or belief. This followed the trend set by Employment Tribunals whereby those 
standards apply in discrimination law despite that area of law protecting only religious and 
philosophical beliefs (rather than beliefs per se) and these standards have been interpreted in 
a more demanding way outside the context of human rights law.130 The level of uncertainty, 
the arbitrary distinctions drawn and the questionable interpretation of the new tests created by 
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the Charity Commission and Employment Tribunals are matters of concern not only in terms 
of whether the reasoning is compatible with Article 9. A number of statements made by 
courts and tribunals are troubling on closer inspection and constitute the ‘stuff of theological 
debate’ which Lord Toulson was keen to avoid as a matter of principle.131  The time is 
therefore apt to reconsider a universal definition of religion under English law.     
 The case law reveals that elements of a universal definition already exist. These need 
to be refashioned in order to remove inconsistencies that exist in different areas of law. The 
Charity Commission in its recent decisions has spoken of there being four characteristics. Re-
examining these in turn taking into account developments in registration, human rights and 
discrimination law may point to a way forward, drawing upon insights from the sociology of 
religion.132 
The first characteristic is that there is a belief. While registration and charity law 
decisions (and legislation) have sought to define what the belief is about (by talking about 
supreme beings or lack of such beings and from Hodkin onwards, distinguishing between 
secular and non-secular beliefs), human rights law has focused on what beliefs do (by looking 
for a world-view and ruling out mere opinions or beliefs that are not genuinely held).   
Discrimination law has adopted a half-way approach, generally following the human rights 
case law but specifying that beliefs must be religious or philosophical and may or may not be 
political. The differences here are reminiscent of a distinction often drawn by sociologists of 
religion between substantive definitions which identify religion for what it is and functional 
definitions which identify religion for what it does.133  While registration and charity law 
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have generally adopted a substantive definition of religion; human rights and discrimination 
law have adopted a functional approach. There are elements of a functional definition of 
religion in Lord Toulson’s description in Hodkin where the language of supreme beings is 
dropped and it is stated that a religion is held by a group of adherents, ‘claims to explain 
mankind’s place in the universe and relationship with the infinite’ and to teach each other 
how to live their lives.134 However, this assumes that religious activity is collective and also 
ignores the other ways in which religion can be manifested (by worship, practice and 
observance as well as by teaching according to the letter of Article 9).135 However, this could 
be fashioned into a definition that protects both individual and collective religious freedom.  
One of the Grainger tests requiring a belief to be on ‘a weighty and substantial aspect of 
human life and behaviour’ appears to go in the right direction.136 
A functional definition is to be preferred for the very reason Lord Toulson gave for 
why a universal definition should not be adopted.   His Lordship’s reference to ‘the different 
contexts in which the issue may arise’ raises the issue of why law protects (or at least 
facilitates) religion. Post-Toleration, the rationale is no longer the promotion and enforcement 
of religious uniformity. Rather, law regulates religion as part of human behaviour.  
Sociologists of religion often refer to their approach towards studying religion as being one of 
‘methodological agnosticism’.137 In the words of Georg Simmel, methodological agnosticism 
requires a distinction to be drawn between the ‘metaphysical event that is readily capable of 
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implying or forming the basis of religion’ and ‘the subjective attitude of human beings’.138 
Methodological agnosticism requires the making of that distinction and the bracketing aside 
of the question of the status of religious claims’.139 As Berger has put it, ‘religion is to be 
understood as a human projection, grounded in the specific infrastructures of human 
history’.140   Methodological agnosticism, as a principle, could inform the interest in 
definitions taken by lawyers as well as sociologists.141  As Roger Cotterrell has noted, both 
law and sociology must define and conceptualize very elusive aspects of human 
behaviour.’142  Sociologists and lawyers are primarily interested in religion as a human 
activity and take an ultimately ‘pragmatical, contextualised approach’ to defining religion.143  
Law does not seek to describe religion as a phenomenon but simply seeks to establish rules to 
regulate and facilitate its exercise within wider social life. 
It follows that a functional approach to defining religion should be taken. The 
approach of Williamson should be followed; it should generally be accepted that freedom of 
religion protects the subjective beliefs of the individual and arbitrary distinctions should not 
be drawn. There should be no requirement that beliefs must be religious or philosophical (as 
in discrimination law), spiritual and non-secular (as in Hodkin and the Jediism decision) or 
that non-philosophical or political beliefs (as in discrimination law) lifestyles and activities 
performed for recreation can be clearly distinguished from manifestations of religion or belief 
(as in Whaley and the Jediism decision). Instead, the word religion should be interpreted as 
including all forms of belief, including beliefs defined by a lack of belief. There will, of 
course, be some claims that legal decision-makers will need to exclude but the reason for the 
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exclusion will relate to the human behaviour – the manifestation of the belief – rather than the 
nature of the belief itself. These claims will typically be excluded not on grounds of the 
definition of religion but in relation to other tests that need to be satisfied in order for the 
religious right to be enjoyed. In the context of charity law, the focus will be on the public 
benefit test; in human rights law, the emphasis will be on the Article 9(2) limitations on the 
manifestation of religion; and in discrimination law the importance will be based on 
proportionality. A functional definition will not protect religious practices that are beyond the 
pale but such practices will be excluded as manifestations of human behaviour rather than on 
grounds of the nature of the belief. An approach based on methodological agnosticism would 
allow legal decision-makers to avoid making difficult and inappropriate theological 
interpretations.  
The second characteristic of religion as articulated by the Charity Commission, 
worship, should no longer be a definitional attribute. The appropriation of the definition of 
‘religious worship’ from Segerdal by South Place Ethical Society in the attempt to define 
‘advancement of religion’ was questionable at the time and is even more questionable now 
given that Hodkin has overruled Segerdal. Lord Toulson’s opinion makes it clear that in 
defining the term ‘a place of meeting for religious worship’ separate consideration is to be 
given to the definitions of religion and of worship. It follows that in every other context the 
definition of worship should not form part of the definition of religion. Rather, it should be 
accepted that religion can be manifested through worship, teaching, practice and observance 
(as the text of Article 9 makes plain) and as Williamson reminds us, the standard here should 
not be too rigid.. A purported religion that carried out acts of cannibalism or terrorism would 
be denied legal protection not because the nature of such activities did not constitute worship 
but because of the social harm that they cause. A functional approach based on 
methodological agnosticism would retain the third characteristic of a religion requiring a 
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certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance but would follow Williamson 
in assessing this subjectively, stressing that these requirements are understood to be ‘modest’ 
and ‘minimum’ level and by not creating conservative thresholds requiring institutional 
presences or for each religion to be distinct.  The Charity Commission’s fourth requirement, 
that of public benefit, is especially important from a functional methodological agnostic 
perspective but should not form part of the definition of religion as such; unless perhaps it 
needs to be stated that religious activities that cause social harm are not to be legally 
protected.  The final limb of the Grainger test may be useful here, as may the guidance in 
Williamson that a belief must be consistent with basic standards of human dignity or 
integrity.144  In short, adopting a functional methodological agnostic approach to defining 
religion could lead to the following universal definition under English law: 
Freedom of religion protects the subjective belief of an individual. Religion includes 
all forms of belief, including lack of belief. The belief must be a genuinely held 
worldview that relates to a weighty and substantial aspect of life and attains a 
minimum and modest level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance. The 
belief can be manifested or advanced through worship, teaching, practice or 
observance. It must be consistent with basic standards of human dignity or integrity. 
                                                 
144Grainger PLC v Nicholson [2009] UKEAT 0219/09/ZT (3 November 2009) para 24; R v Secretary of State 
for Education and Employment and others, ex parte Williamson [2005] UKHL 15 at para 24. 
